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Statutes,

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
First Issue: Did the district court err in its application of the civil

~

stalking statute by focusing primarily on an incident that was not directed
at the Petitioner, and by failing to adequately take into account the parties'
business relationship?
Standard of Review: The proper interpretation and application of a

statute is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, affording no
deference to the district court's legal conclusion. Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8,

,r 16, 322 P.3d 728.
Preservation: Counsel for Mr. Barnes emphasized the importance of

the parties' business relationship at several points during the evidentiary
hearing. See, e.g., R. 65:8;7-18; 167:23-24 (explaining that the parties' "had
reason and purpose to be in contact with one another" as a result of their
"landlord-tenant relationship").
Second Issue: Did the district court err by prohibiting Mr. Barnes from

owning or possessing a firearm for three years?

~

Standard of Review: Whether a district court has improperly denied

a person's constitutional rights is a question of law reviewed for correctness.

See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,

,r 25, 100 P.3d 1177 ("Constitutional issues

... are questions of law that we review for correctness."), abrogated on other

grounds by State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P~3d 645.
Preservation: Mr. Barnes preserved this issue during the evidentiary

hearing below and in his objections to Mr. Carson's proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. R. 65:8:22-23; 9:2-4; 134:5-6; R. 38.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

The following legal authorities can be found in Addendum B.
Utah Code§ 77-3a-101
Utah Code§ 76-5-106.5
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 6
Utah Code§ 53-5A-102
Utah Code§ 76-10-503
U.S. Const. amend. II
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statement of Facts
In September 2013, Randy Hunt, as landlord, and a company called
TCM Bertha, LLC, as tenant, entered into a lease agreement for
approximately forty acres of land in Tooele County. Pl. Ex. 1. Tim Carson,
Bertha's principal and owner, signed-the agreement on Bertha's behalf. Id.;

~

R. 65:81:14-15. Under the terms of the agreement, Bertha was required to,

among other things, (1) "ins~re the Premises" and (2) provide an "estoppel

C..;

certificate" within "ten (10) day$" of the "Landlord's request." Pl. Ex. 1,

,r,r

5, 22. Furthermore, Bertha was required to "permit inspection of the

~

Premises during reasonable business hours by Landlord." Pl. Ex. 1, ,r 12.
At the time the lease was in effect, Bertha operated as some kind of
mining company that would engage in "sampling." R. 65:81:11-13. To
support that operation, Mr. Carson set up generators,

11

crushers," and

related equipment on the property. R. 65:82:1-6. Mr. Carson claimed that
he had not had an opportunity to get things going before vacating the
II

property, but, upon his departure, thirty buckets of ore" were left on the
property. R. 65:83:4-6; 85:9-12.

3

'1

In May 2014, Tom Barnes, a 72-year old Navy veteran and landowner
of rural properties in Florida, Texas, and Utah, R. 65:114:11-13, purchased
the property from Mr. Hunt. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Barnes wrote a letter to
Mr. Carson, asking that Mr. Carson provide the proof of insurance and the

estoppel certificate required under paragraphs 5 and 22 of the agreement.
Resp. Ex. 2. Despite Mr. Barnes' request, Mr. Carson never provided proof
of insurance or a proper estoppel certificate. R. 65:80:16-17; 118:9-10.
A gravel road runs from Highway 36 to the leased property. Large
gates stand between the gravel road and the leased property, but the gates
themselves are not located on the leased property. R. 65:137:14-17. To deal
with trespassers, a common problem facing property owners in sparse rural
areas, Mr. Barnes frequently emphasized to Mr. Carson the importance of
"locking the gates." R. 65:136:9-13. While at the property, however, Mr.
VJ>

Carson refused to lock the gates, insisting that he and Mr. Barnes had
reached no such "agreement." R. 65:100:21-24.
Another problem for property owners in sparse rural areas is the lack
of protection from wild animals,. trespassers, or criminals. R. 65:139:24-

~

140:10. To protect himself and his wife while on his properties, Mr. Barnes
carries a pistol. R. 65:130:1-15. While serving in the Navy, Mr. Barnes was
4

trained in the use of various firearms, and for eight years prior to the entry
of this injunction, Mr. Barnes had a concealed-carry permit, which required
him to undergo firearms training. R. 65:131:2-18. Fortunately, he has never
had to "fire[]" the gun he carries. R. 65:130:25-131:1.
On the night of October 27, 2014, at around 7:00 p.m., Mr. Barnes and
his wife drove down to the property. Upon their arrival, they noticed that
the gates "were open" and that the locks on the gates had "been removed."
R. 65:128:4-6 .. Concerned, they drove up to the building. They saw a "black
sedan" parked out front and two people they did not recognize-a man and
a woman-working on a "piece of machinery." R. 65:128:7-12. Mr. Barnes
instructed the couple to leave. After doing s~, he asked the couple where
the locks were, to which they responded, "in the building." R. 65:128:17-18.

~

Mr. Barnes checked the building but did not see the locks to the gates, so he
again asked the couple where the locks were. Rather than simply turn over

w

the locks, the couple locked their car (where the locks were located), R.
65:128:24-25, and said they wouldn't tum them over unless Mr. Barnes

GJ

promised not to lock them in, R. 65:26:24-25.
Mr. Barnes threatened to call the sheriff, at which point the woman
returned to the car, unlocked it, and reached inside. R. 65:27:3-4; 129:6-8 .
.I

5

~

Mr. Barnes, concerned for his own safety and that of his wife, pulled his gun
from his car and again asked the couple to tum over the locks. R. 65:129:19130:5. They finally did so. R. 65:130:5. Mr. Barnes took the locks and the
couple left.1

Throughout this exchange, Mr. Carson never made an

appearance. He had left four hours earlier. R. 65:33:12-15. Mr. Barnes
attempted several calls to Mr. Carson to report what had happened. R.
65:132:2-6; 133:6-7.
About a week later, Mr. Carson and others started moving equipment
off the property. R. 65:46:19-23; 47:5-6. Mr. Barnes came down to the
property, got out of his car, and walked toward Mr. Carson. Mr. Carson told
Mr. Barnes that if Mr. Barnes was .(Ja younger man," Mr. Carson would
"whoop" his "butt." R. 65:29:17-20. The next day, Mr. Barnes drove down
to the property to see what was going on, and noticed that Mr. Carson was
.J

moving out more equipment. As Mr. Barnes started to leave, he was blocked
by a pickup and trailer.

~

R. 65:120:18-20.

eventually Mr. Barnes was allowed to leave. R. 65:121:7-9. He drove to the

In connection with this incident, Mr. Barnes entered pleas in abeyance
to two misdemeanor counts of reckless endangerment. Both counts were
dismissed on June 19, 2015, and the case was closed. See Docket Report,
Case No. 141300512, attached at Addendum C.
1

v;

The police were called, and

6

Hampton Inn, where he was staying. While parked there, he saw two
pickups and trailers drive by with equipment that had been removed from
the property~ R. 65:121:12-16. Mr. Barnes knew that, under the agreement,
"[a]ny alterations or improvements to the Premises" could not be removed
from the property, Pl. Ex. 1, 110, R. 65:124:16-18, so, out of "curio[sity]," he
and his wife followed the pickups and trailers for about "a mile,"

R.

65:121 :13-15.
Based on Mr. Carson's failure to provide proof of insurance and an
estoppel certificate as required by the lease, Mr. Barnes considered Mr.
Carson a" noncompliant lessee." R. 65:118:13-14. Prior to November 6, 2014,
Mr. Barnes contacted an attorney to assist him with the "process" of evicting
Mr. Carson from the property. R. 65:118:23-25. Mr. Barnes had previously

~

sent Mr. Carson a letter, addressing it to a P.O. Box. Resp. Ex. 2. Mr.
Carson's rent checks contained a street address in the top left corner. On

~

November 6, Mr. Barnes drove by that address to verify its accuracy. In
doing so, he drove right by Mr. Carson. R. 65:119:10-14. Mr. Carson flipped·
around and followed Mr. Barnes for "20 or 30 minutes" despite repeated
requests from a 911 operator to stop. R. 65:119:15-21; 157-63 ("Dispatcher:

7

~

Why are you following him?"; "Dispatcher: First of all, I need you to stop
following him."; "Dispatcher: I don't want you to follow him any longer.").
Statement of Proceedings
On November 7, Mr. Carson filed a request for a civil stalking
injunction. R. 1. As" stalking events," Mr. Carson identified the events from
November 4 and 6. R. 2. Under the request for "other stalking events," Mr.
Carson referred to four police reports he had attached. R. 2. Three of the
four reports Mr. Carson attached, however, involved Mr. Barnes' request for
the police to keep the peace. R. 8, 10, 13. The other report did not involve
Mr. Carson. R. 11. Mr. Carson also did not mention in his initial filing that
Mr. Barnes allegedly "put his finger" in Mr. Carson's chest on November 3.
~

R. 65:86:8-13.

Three days later, on November 10, the court signed and issued a
l.iP

Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction-which constituted an Ex Parte
Order-prohibiting Mr. Barnes from "stalking" Mr. Carson, from contacting

..;)

Mr. Carson, and ordering Mr. Barnes to "stay away" from Mr. Carson. R.
15. In addition, the order stated as follows:

No guns or firearms! It is a federal crime for you to
have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm

8

or ammunition, including hunting weapons, while
this civil stalking injunction is in effect.
R. 16. Mr. Barnes requested a hearing on the propriety of the injunction eight
days later, on November 18, and on February 11, 2015, an evidentiary
hearing was held. R. 17, 23, 65. Several of the events described above were
discussed at the hearing.
Whether Mr. Barnes would be able to own and carry firearms was also
discussed. Early on in the hearing, counsel for Mr. Barnes informed the
district court that it was "imperative that [Mr. Barnes] be allowed to carry a
firearm when he's out in these rural areas." R. 65:8:22-23. Later on, counsel
asked Mr. Barnes why it was "important" to Mr. Barnes that he "'be able to
keep [his] right to own and possess firearms," but the court sustained a
relevance-based objection to that line of questioning. R. 65:134:5-135:10. In
closing arguments, counsel reiterated that Mr. Carson was "simply doing
this to try and affect [Mr. Barnes'] right to own and possess a firearm." R.
65:170:4-6.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court held that the civil stalking
injunction would remain in place for an additional three years, until
February 11, 2018.

R. 65:171-76.

The court referred to several of the

9

incidents described above, found that Mr. Barnes "engaged in a course of
conduct directed at [Mr. Carson]," and ultimately concluded that Mr.
Barnes' conduct would cause "a reasonable person to fear for the safety of"
that person's "wife and minor children." R. 65:175:15-19.
Other than its finding that Mr. Barnes "displayed" and "brandished"
his pistol in the presence of third parties, the court did not mention Mr.
Barnes' ability to own or carry firearms under the terms of the injunction. R.
65:172:21-173:6. Mr. Barnes' counsel then asked as a "point of clarification"
whether the restriction on Mr. Barnes' ability to own a firearm applied only
"in the State of Utah." R. 65:176:10-13. The court responded as follows:
I, I will tell you, I'm not certain. It certainly does in
the State of Utah. I'm not going to opine as to what
other states may do, or what the federal government
may consider it. And, and so I, I just, I don't have an
answer to that question, And I don't want to say
something that may be proven wrong hereafter.

R. 65:176:14-19.
Shortly after the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Carson submitted a
proposed Civil Stalking Injunction for the district court's signature. R. 34.
The bottom of the proposed injunction warned Mr. Barnes that "[i]t may be
a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any

10

firearm or ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this civil stalking
injunction is in effect." R. 37 (emphasis added). The body of the injunction,
II

by contrast, left no doubt, stating that the injunction include[s] a restriction
where [Mr. Barnes] shall not be permitted to own or possess a firearm." R.
36.

II

On the last page, alongside a section entitled Other Orders," the

injunction reaffirmed that Mr. Barnes "shall not be permitted to own or
possess a firearm." R. 37.

Mr. Barnes objected to the proposed injunction's blanket restriction on
his right to own and possess a firearm. R. 38-39. Nonetheless, the court
entered the injunction as it had been proposed. R. 56. Besides its finding
II

that Mr. Barnes' display of his pistol was concerning," the court did not
.explain its decision to restrict Mr. Barnes' right to own or possess a firearm.
This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court erred when it entered a civil stalking injunction
against Mr. Barnes. To start, the court relied heavily on an incident that
occurred on October 27, 2014, but that incident cannot comprise part of the
11

course of conduct" of which Mr. Barnes is alleged to have engaged because
II

it was not directed at" Mr. Carson. Mr. Carson had left the property several
11

<;;

hours before the incident occurred. Because the October 27 incident colored
the district court's view of the entire case, the injunction should be reversed
and the case remanded for that reason alone.
In addition, two of the subsequent incidents between Mr. Barnes and
Mr. Carson involved nothing more than a landlord exercising his contractual
rights. On November 4, Mr. Barnes was entitled to follow Mr. Carson for
"about a mile" to ensure that nothing he was hauling away from the
property amounted to "fixtures" that were required, under the parties'
agreement, to remain on the property. On November 6, Mr. Barnes was
entitled to verify Mr. Carson's residential address to ensure that the process
of evicting Mr. Carson was consistent with state law.
Finally, even if the Court upholds the injunction's general terms
against Mr. Barnes, it should vacate and remove the injunction's restriction
viJ

on Mr. Barnes' right to own and carry firearms. An individual's right to own
and carry firearms rests on the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

vJ)

and Article 1, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. Under both provisions, an
individual has the right to own and carry firearms for lawful purposes,

,..:J

including self-defense. This right is not unlimited, and both federal and
Utah law properly restrict a person's right to own and carry firearms under
12

certain circumstances. But none of those circumstances are present here.
Because there is not a federal or Utah statutory provision that prohibits Mr.
Barnes' constitutional right to own and carry a firearm under these
circumstances, that right may not be infringed. Thus, even if the injunction
was properly entered as a general matter (it was not), the Court should still
vacate and remove the injunction's restriction on Mr. Barnes' right to own
and carry a firearm.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE INJUNCTION WAS WRONGLY ENTERED BECAUSE AT
LEAST ONE OF THE INCIDENTS WAS NOT ''DIRECTED AT"
MR. CARSON, AND OTHER INCIDENTS WOULD NOT CAUSE
A REASONABLE COMMERCIAL TENANT TO BE AFRAID.

Mr. Barnes should not be subject to a permanent injunction involving
Mr. Carson for at least two reasons. First, the primary incident concerning
II

the district court was not directed at" Mr. Carson. Second, two of the acts
II

at issue do not form part of a course of conq.uct" that would cause a
reasonable commercial tenant to be afraid. Without these acts, the injunction
lacks an adequate statutory foundation.
A.

The October 27 Incident was not "Directed at" Mr. Carson.

The court's conclusion to the contrary- and the entry of the injunction
generally-was based on the incident on October 27. As described in the
13

GI

Statement of Facts, Mr. Barnes had good reason, given the prevailing
circumstances on October 27, to fear for his and his wife's safety. It was dark,
the couple refused to tum over the locks to the gates, and the woman reached
il).to her car without declaring her purpose in doing so.
The court's reliance on this incident to enter an injunction against Mr.
B~mes is a problem for a mor~ fundamental reason. The i!lcident was not
"directed at" Mr. Carson. The first element of Utah's definition of" stalking"
is that it be" directed at" the person who is seeking the restraining order.
Utah Code§ 76-5-106.S(l)(b).. To "direct" an act "at" someone requires a
II

person to aim" his or her conduct toward that someone. Black's Law
Dictionary 491 (8th ed. 2004).
As to the events that occurred on October 27, that element remains
unsatisfied. All agree that Mr. Carson was not on the property during the
VJJ

incident in question. He had departed four hours earlier. Confirming that
Mr_. Barnes was not directing his acts at Mr. Carson, Mr. Barnes repeatedly

-~

called Mr. Carson after the incident to explain what had happened. R.
65:132:2-6; 133:6-7. The district cou·rt never explained how Mr. Barnes'

Vi9

II

actions could be "directed" or aimed" at Mr. Carson despite Mr. Carson's
absence. In fact, although the court frequently referred to the incident that
14

occurred on October 27, see, e.g., 65:172:21-25, the court never expressly
II

found that the October 27 incident was directed at" Mr. Carson. R. 65:173:1.
The court thought the incident important because Mr. Carson was
aware of it. Mr. Carson's awareness of the incident, however, does not
II

transform the incident into one directed at" Mr. Carson. What is more,
relying on knowledge of events in a person's past-events that are not
11

II

directed at" the petitioner- to establish the fear" required by the statute
II

runs contrary to the statute's text. The statute states that acts directed at"
the petitioner are what constitute a" course of conduct," and that the·" course
of conduct" is what must cause a reasonable person to fear. Utah Code§ 76II

5-106.5(2). Acts that are not directed at" a particular petitioner, in other
II

words, may not form part of the course of conduct" that causes a reasonable
person to fear. The district court's conclusion to the contrary demands
reversal.

B.

1..·· .•

Vil.ii

A Reasonable Commercial Landlord Would Have No Reason
to Know that the Events of November 4 and 6 Would Cause a
Reasonable Commercial Tenant to Be Afraid.
II

The acts of Mr. Barnes' that were directed at" Mr. Carson would not
have caused a reasonable commercial tenant to fear for himself or for third
persons. To qualify for an injunction, a petitioner in Utah "must meet an
15

objective-not subjective-standard." Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8,

,r

24, 322

P.3d 728. This means that the petitioner must prove that the respondent's
conduct "would cause" fear "to a reasonable person in the petitioner's
circumstances." Id.

,r 25 (emphasis added).

As the reference to "petitioner's

circumstances" illustrates, the inquiry is not purely objective. By taking into
account a person's individual circums.tances, Utah's Stalking Statute
"provides for" what the Utah Supreme Court calls "an individualized
objective standard." Id.

,r

26 (quoting and discussing Utah Code § 76-5-

106.S(e)). In applying this standard, courts take into account, among other
things, "the victim's knowledge of and relationship with the defendant." Id.

,r 27.
Here, Mr. Barnes was Mr. Carson's landlord, and the two of them were
parties to a lease agreement involving real property. As a result of their
.)

business relationship, some level of personal contact was inevitable. Things
had not gone smoothly. Mr. Barnes had frequently asked Mr. Carson to lock

·,..J

the gates to the property. Just as frequently, Mr. Carson had refused. Mr.
Barnes had asked Mr. Carson to provide proof of insurance and a proper

,J

estoppel certificate. Mr. Carson had refused. It is undeniable that Mr.
Carson's refusal to lock the gates and failure to provide proof of insurance
16

and a proper estoppel certificate produced tension in the parties'
relationship. R. 65:172:1-2. But there is no reason for that tension to result
in a civil stalking injunction.
In entering the injunction, the Court emphasized events that took place
on November 4 and 6, but on both occasions Mr. Barnes was merely carrying
out his responsibilities as landlord. As to November 4, Mr. Barnes saw
pickup trucks and trailers leaving the property loaded up with equipment.
Mr. Barnes knew that, under the agreement,

11

[a]ny alterations or

improvements to the Premises" could not be removed from the property, Pl.
Ex. 1, ,r 10, R. 65:124:16-18, so, out of curio[sity]," he and his wife followed
II

~

II

the pickups and trailers for about a mile," R. 65:121:13-15. The district
court never addressed Mr. Barnes' explanation for the November 4 incident

6

and never explained why Mr. Barnes' actions were concerning in light of the
parties' relationship and in light of Mr. Barnes' rights under the agreement.

{v

See Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Limited
contact during legitimate ... encounters ... , without conduct directed at
causing physical harm or emotional distress to an intended person, does not
fall under the statute's purview.").

17

~

The district court did reject Mr. Barnes' explanation for driving by Mr.
Carson's residence, noting that he already had Mr. Carson's address" on the
check."

R. 65:174:16-17.

But addresses on checks are often outdated,

especially checks belonging to those, like Mr. Carson, who work hard to
keep their address secret. In addition, given Mr. Carson's stubbornness and
cantankerousness in other areas (gate-locking, insurance-providing), Mr.
Barnes had every reason to make sure the process of eviction was done "by
the book." Finally, the court never reconciled Mr. Carson's decision to follow
Mr. Barnes for the next twenty or thirty minutes (despite repeated
instructions from dispatch to stop doing so, R. 65:119:15-21; 157-63) with the
notion that a reasonable commercial tenant would have feared for his own
Cd)

or his family's safety. In light of the parties' business relationship, the
November 4 and 6 incidents would not have caused a reasonable

@

commercial tenant to fear for himself or others.
In sum, the October 27 incident was not" directed at" Mr. Carson and

l,{j)

so cannot be included in Mr. Barnes' alleged "course of conduct."

In

addition, the incidents that occurred on November 4 and 6 would not have
~

caused a reasonable person to fear. As a result, the statute's requirement of

18

at least two acts directed at a person and likely to cause that person to fear
is left unfulfilled, and the injunction should be reversed.
II.

THE INJUNCTION UNLAWFULLY RESTRICTS MR. BARNES'
RIGHT-UNDER THE U.S. AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS-TO
OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM.
The injunction wrongly prohibits Mr. Barnes from owning or

possessing a firearm. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and

~

Article 1, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution protect a person's right to own
and carry a firearm. This right, under both constitutions, encompasses a

GJ

person's ability to defend himself against danger and to own an~ carry
weapons in case of confrontation. The right to own and carry weapons,

w

including firearms, is not without limits, but no such limits apply here.
Thus, even if the injunction was properly entered, its restriction on Mr.
Barnes' right to own and possess firearms cannot stand.
A.

The U.S. and Utah Constihttions Protect an Individual's Right
to Own and Carry a Firearm.

Mr. Barnes has a right under the U.S. and Utah Constitutions to own
and carry firearms.
The U.S. Constitution provides: "A well-regulated militia being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. Amend. II. As construed by
19

~

the U.S. Supreme Court, this language uguarantee[s] the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." District of Columbia v.

Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). As further described in a later opinion-in
which the Second Amendment was held to apply against the States-the
"Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for
lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home." McDonald

v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010).
On their facts, Heller and McDonald were limited to weapons
restrictions in a person's abode, and the effect those restrictions had on a
,_;;

person's right to defend "hearth and home."

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3044. But of course,
vi>

11
[

Heller, 554 U.S. at 635;

c]onfrontations are not limited

to the home." Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, the
right to bear arms for self-defense "is as important outside the home as

;.J

inside,'' and includes a person's right to carry arms in public. Id. at 942.

In Utah, a person's right to own and carry firearms enjoys a similarly
yg

"impressive constitutional ... pedigree." Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 UT
62,

,r 13, 96 P.3d 950.

According to the Utah Constitution, "[t]he individual

right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self,
family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes
20

shall not be infringed."

Utah Const. Art. I, § 6.

Thus, like the U.S.

Constitution, Utah's Constitution protects a person's "right'to keep and bear
arms' for self-defense or any other lawful purpose." Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 2015 UT 83, ,r 26, 795 Utah Adv. Rep. 64.
B.

Federal and Utah Law Do Not Authorize Restrictions on a
Person's Constitutional Right to Own and Carry a Firearm
Under these Circumstances.

Nothing in Federal or Utah law allows Mr. Barnes' right to own and
carry firearms to be restricted under the circumstances presented here. To
be sure, the right protected by the U.S. and Utah Constitutions is not
unlimited. Under Federal law, the right is not a right" to keep and carry any
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Thus, under federal law, felons, the mentally ill,
fugitives, children, illegal aliens, dishonorably-discharged veterans, persons
who have renounced their U.S. citizenship, and persons who are subject to
restraining orders that involve the person's "intimate partner," among
others, may not "possess" or "receive" any "'firearm or ammunition which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 18
U.S.C. § 922(g).
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II

Likewise, Utah law permits the legislature to defin[e] the lawful use
of arms." Utah Const. Art. 1, § 6. In accordance with that constitutional
authorization, the Utah Legislature has restricted the ability of the same
,,,)

kinds of persons (e.g., felons, illegal aliens, children) to own or carry
firearms. Utah Code§§ 76-10-503(1)(a), (b), (2), (3).
Here is the problem: Whether under Federal or Utah law, Mr. Barnes
falls within none of these restricted categories. He is not a felon, mentally
ill, a child, an illegal alien, or a fugitive from justice.

He was not

dishonorably discharged from the Navy and he has not renounced his U.S.
citizenship. True, for purposes of federal law, Mr. Barnes will be subject to
a restraining order if this Court upholds the order's validity, but because Mr.
~

II

Barnes and Mr. Carson are not now and never have been intimate partners,
the federal restriction on firearm possession simply does not apply." Sheeran

..;;

v. Thomas, 2014 UT App 285,

,r 17, 340 P.3d 797.

It does not matter that one of the incidents described at the hearing
y)

involved a firearm. In connection with that incident, Mr. Barnes entered a
plea in abeyance to two charges of reckless endang~rment-both

·-J

misdemeanors. But those charges have since been dismissed, see Addendum
B, and the overarching question remains the same: Even in light of Mr.
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Barnes' plea, does any provision of Federal or Utah law "specifically"
prohibit Mr. Barnes' constitutional right to own and carry firearms? Utah
Code§ 53-Sa-102(2). The answer also remains the same: No. Because no
.provision of law "specifically" applies under these circumstances, Mr.
Barnes may not be denied his constitutional right to "own[], possess[]," or
"keep[] a firearm at" his "residence, property, business, or in any vehicle
lawfully in [his] possession or lawfully under [his] control." Id.§ 102(2)(a).
In sum, even if the Court upholds the injunction's general terms, it
should vacate and remove the injunction's restriction on Mr. Barnes' right to
own and carry firearms.
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should reverse the entry of a civil stalking
injunction against Mr. Barnes. In the alternative, the Court should vacate and
remove the injunction's restriction on Mr. Barnes's ability to own and carry
firearms.
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DATED this 19th day of October, 2015.

Attorneys for
Respondent/ Appellant
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The Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: March 05t 2015
/s/ Robe
01:14:07 PM

JEREMY M. SHORTS (USB 10983)
DAVID R. TODD (USB 13884)
LAW OFFICES OF JEREMY M. SHORTS, LLC
P.O. Box 971233
Orem, UT 84097
Telephone: (80 I) 610-9879
Fax: (801) 494-2058
E-Mail: jeremy@utahevictionlaw.com
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, TOOELE DEPARTMENT

TIM CARSON,
CIVIL STALKING
INJUNCTION

Petitioner.

vs.

Civil No. 140301827
Judge Robert Adkins

TOM BARNES,
Respondent.
Petitioner (person who asked for the stalking injunction):

Tim_

--.::C~a=r.-=s=-o.:..:.n _____
Last

First Name

Middle
Other people protected by this order:

417 Highland Drive_

Age

Name

Address and phone # (to keep
private, leave blank):

Relationship to
Petitioner

Minor children residing
with Petitioner

Street

Tooele Utah 84074
1

I.C.

--12-.
_a_

B.C.

Child
Child

City -- State - Zip

435-830-8022
Phone#

Petitioner's attorney (if any):

Civil Stalking Injunction
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Jerem't.. M. Shorts (US.B #10f1_83l

Phone#

Approved by Board of District Court Judges, June 2013
Revised December 15, 2014

801-610-9879
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Respondent

Describe Respondent

(person who must obey this stalking injunction):

Tom

Barnes
Middle

First Name

Sex

Race

Date of
Birth

Male

White

3/7/1942

Eye
Color

Hair
Color
Grey

Height

Weight·

Last

Other Names Used _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Social Security Number

(last four digits only)

Distinguishing features (scars, tattoos, limp, etc.)

Address

13303 Kingsride Lane
Street

Driver's license issued by

Houston, TX 77079
City -- State -

(State): _ _ _ _ _ Expires _ _ _ _ __

Zip

Warning/ [ X JWeapon involved (Box to be marked if applicable).
There was a hearing on (date): February 11 2015 . The Respondent was given notice and an
opportunity to be heard in the hearing that gave rise to this order. The following people were
present at the hearing:
[ X] Petitioner
[ X] Petitioner's attorney (name): Jeremy M. Shorts
[ X] Respondent [ X] Respondent's attorney (name): Richard Tanner ,
[ X ] Other (name) Witnesses Stuart Burgess and Crystal Burgess
The Court reviewed the Request for Civil Stalking Injunction and: c x J received argument and
evidence, u accepted the stipulation of the parties, [_] entered the default of the Respondent for
failure to appear, u other: _ _ _ _ _ _, and finds that there is reason to believe that stalking
has occurred and that the Respondent is the stalker. (Utah Code Sect77-3a-101)

The Court finds that Respondent made numerous visits to the leased property.
The court understands that the lease gives Respondent some reasonable right to
inspect the leased premises. The court finds that Respondent's actions went
beyond that reasonable right to inspect under utah law and/or the right to inspect
stated in the Lease (see Lease at ,r12). Respondent had previously seen Mr. & Mrs.
Burgess on the leased property, who were legally present as either licensees,
permitees or coworkers of Petitioner who were engaged in activity on the leased
property for the benefit of the Petitioner. The court finds the testimony of Mr. & Mrs.
Burgess more credible than the testimony of Respondent. Court believes that on
October 27, 2014 and in the presence of Mr. & Mrs. Burgess, a firearm was
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displayed by Respondent and loaded with a magazine inserted into the pistol. The.
Court finds at a minimum that this constituted brandishing a weapon, which conduct
is concerning.
In reviewing Utah's stalking statute (including Utah Code Ann 77-3a-106.5), the
Court finds that Respondent did approach or confront Petitioner at the leased
premises and that when the Petitioner was not present he returned to the leased
premises and contacted Mr. & Mrs. Burgess. The Court finds that Respondent also
appeared, monitored, observed or surveiled Petitioner's residence. After hearing
Respondent's explanation, the Court finds there was no real reason to drive by
Petitioner's residence.
These actions rightfully caused a concern to the Petitioner where the
Respondent had cut a cable for the key to the generator on the property, previously
showed a firearm, and had prior confrontations on the leased premises and
Petitioner's home.
The Court finds that Petitioner intentionally or knowingly engaged in a course of
conduct directed at Petitioner and knew or should have known that the course of
conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for the person's own safety or the
safety of a third person (Petitioner himself, his coworkers, his wife and/or his minor
children). The Court finds that Petitioner's stalking actions occurred on more than
two occasions.
The Court finds that the stalking has been established. The stalking injunction
will continue as stated herein for a period of three years. This shall include a
restriction where the Respondent shall not be permitted to own or possess a firearm.
Service of this Order upon respondent shall be completed and effective through NEF
E-Filing Notification to Respondent's counsel.
The Respondent must obey all orders initialed by the judicial officer. These orders
replace any previous temporary stalking injunction in this case. Violation of these orders is a
criminal Class A Misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine. A second or
subsequent violation can result in more severe penalties.

1 [X]

Personal Conduct Order
Do not stalk the Petitioner. This means you must not follow, threaten, annoy,
harass, or cause distress to the Petitioner. For a legal definition of stalking, see
Utah Code, sections 76-5-106.5 and 77-3a-101.

2

[ X]

No Contact Order
Do not contact, phone, text, mail, e-mail, or communicate either directly or
indirectly in any way with the Petitioner and any person listed on page 1 of this
order.
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3

[X]

Stay Away Order
Stay away from:
[X] a. The Petitioner's current or future: l x 1 Vehicle [XJJob [XJ Home,
premises and property (list current addresses below)
Home address:

~

Shop address:

417 Highland Drive Tooele Utah 84074
553 NQd;h 7th Street. Iooele. Utah 8~Q74

Describe vehicles:
2QQ5 Ford F-350 Truck dack gre~; 2Q1
silver; :l 996 Dodge 250 rgg.

a Eord Edge

l 1 b. Other (specify):
~

5

[X]

Other Orders: Resgondent sball not be germitted to own or gossgss a firearm.

Warnings to the Respondent:
•

•

•

Attention: This is an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find you in
contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other
crime you may have committed in disobeying this order.
This order is valid in all U.S. states and-territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal
lands. If you go to another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal
judge can send you to prison.
It may be a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this civil stalking injunction is in effect.

This order expires in three years on: ___F___e. .b. .......ru""""'a.....ry_____:l. .:l. ______2. . .o
. . .1. .__
a__
Month

Day

Year

END OF INJUNCTION - SIGNATURE AT T O P · - - - - - ~
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ADDENDUMB

Utah Code § 77-3a-101

(1) As used in this chapter, "stalking" means the crime of stalking as defined in Section 76-5-106.5. Stalking injunctions may not be obtained
against law enforcement officers, governmental investigators, or licensed
private investigators, acting in their official capacity.
(2) Any person who believes that he or she is the victim of stalking may file
a verified written petition for a civil stalking injunction against the alleged
stalker with the district court in the district in which the petitioner or respondent resides or in which any of the events occurred. A minor with his
or her parent or guardian may file a petition on his or her own behalf, or a
parent, guardian, or custodian may file a petition on the minor's behalf.
(3) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms for petitions, ex parte civil stalking injunctions, civil stalking
injunctions, service and any other necessary forms in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter on or before July 1, 2001. The office shall provide
the forms to the clerk of each district court.
(a) All petitior:is, injunctions, ex parte injunctions, and any other necessary forms shall be issued in the form adopted by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
(b) The offices of the court clerk shall provide the forms to persons
seeking to proceed "!,lnder this chapter.
(4) The petition for a civil stalking injunction shall include:
(a) the name of the petitioner; however, the petitioner's address shall
be disclosed to the court for purposes of service, but, on request of the petitioner, the address may not be listed on the petition, and shall be protected
and maintained in a separate document or automated database, not subject
to release, disclosure, or any form of public access except as ordered by the
court for good cause shown;
(b) the name and address, if known, of the respondent;

4827-6090-8585. VI

(c) specific events and dates of the actions constituting the alleged
stalking;
(d) if there is a prior court order concerning the same conduct, the
name of the court in which the order was rendered; and
(e) corroborating evidence of stalking, which may be in the form of a
police report, affidavit, record, statement, item, letter, or any other evidence which tends to prove the allegation of ~talking.
(S)(a) If the court determines that the!e is reason to believe that an offense of stalking has occurred, an ex parte civil stalking injunction may be
issued by the court that includes any of the following:
(i) respondent may be enjoined from committing stalking;

(ii) respondent may be restrained from coming near the residence, place of employment, or school of the other party or specifically designated locations or persons;
(iii) respondent may be restrained from contacting, directly or
indirectly, the other party, including personal, written or telephone contact
with the other party, the other party's employers, employees, fellow workers or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the other party; or
(iv) any other relief necessary or convenient for the protection
of the petitioner and other specifically designated persons under the circumstances.
(b) If the petitioner and respondent have minor children, the court
shall follow the provisions of Section 78B-7-106 and take into consideration
the respondent's custody and parent-time rights while ensuring the safety
of the victim and the minor children. If the court issues a civil stalking injunction, but declines to address custody and parent-time issues, a copy of
the- stalking injunction shall be filed in any action in which custody and
parent-time issues are being considere~.
2
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(6) Within 10 days of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the respondent is entitled to request, in writing, an evidentiary hearing on the
civil stalking injunction.
(a) A hearing requested by the respondent shall be held within 10
days from the date the request is filed with the court unless the court finds
compelling reasons to continue the hearing. The hearing shall then be held
at the earliest possible time. The burden is on the petitioner to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the respondent has occurred.
(b) An ex parte civil stalking injunction issued under this section
shall state on its face:
(i) that the respondent is entitled to a hearing, upon written request within 10 days of the service of the order;
(ii) the name and address of the district court where the request may be filed;
(iii) that if the respondent fails to request a hearing within 10
days of service; the ex parte civil stalking injunction is automatically modified to a civil stalking injunction without further notice to the respondent
and that the civil stalking injunction expires three years after service of the
ex parte civil stalking injunction; and
(iv) that if the respondent requests, in writing, a hearing after
the ten-day period after service, the court shall set a hearing within areasonable time from the date requested.

(7) At the hearing, the court may modify, revoke, or continue the injunction. The burden is on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the respondent has occurred.
(8) The ex parte civil stalking injunction and civil stalking injunction shall
include the following statement: "Attention. This is an official court order.
If you disobey this order, the court may find you in contempt. You may also ~e arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other crime
3
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you may have committed in disobeying this order."
(9) The ex parte civil stalking injunction' shall be served on the respondent
within 90 days from the date it is signed. An ex parte civil stalking injunction is effective upon service. If no hearing is requested in writing by the
respondent within 10 days of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the ex parte civil stalking injunction automatically becomes a civil
stalking injunction without further notice to the respondent and expires
three years from the date of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction.
(10) If the respondent requests a hearing after the ten-day period after service, the court shall set a hearing within a reasonable time from the date
requested. At the hearing, the burden is on the respondent to show good
cause why the civil stalking injunction should be dissolved or modified.
(11) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been
returned, excluding weekends and holidays, the clerk of the court from
which the ex parte civil stalking injunction was issued shall enter a copy of
the ex parte civil stalking injunction and proof of service or acceptance of
service in the statewide network for warrants or a similar system.
(a) The effectiveness of an ex parte civil stalking injunctio~ or civil
stalking injunction shall not depend upon its entry in the statewide system
and, for enforcement purposes, a certified copy of an ex parte civil stalking
injunction or civil stalking injunction is presumed to be a valid existing order of the court for a period of three years from the date of service of the ex
parte civil stalking injunction on the respondent.
(b) Any changes or modifications of the ex parte civil stalking injunction are effective upon service on the respondent. The original ex parte civil
stalking injunction continues in effect until service of the changed or modified civil stalking injunction on the respondent.
(12) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been
returned, excluding weekends and holidays, the clerk of the court shall enter a copy of the changed or modified civil stalking injunction and proof of
service or acceptance of service in the statewide network for warrants or a
similar system.
4
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(13) The ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction may
be dissolved at any time upon application of the petitioner to the court
which granted it.

(14) The court clerk shall provide, without charge, to the petitioner one certified copy of the injunction issued by the court and one certified copy of
the proof of service of the injunction on the respondent. Charges may be
imposed by the clerk's office for any additional copies, certified or not certified in accordance with Rule 4-202.08 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
(15) The remedies provided in this chapter for enforcement of the orders of
the court are in addition to any other civil and criminal remedies available.
The district court shall hear and decide all matters arising pursuant to this
section.
(16) After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the court may enter
an order requiring any party to pay the costs of the action, including reasonable attorney fees.
(17) This chapter does not apply to protective orders or ex parte protective
orders issued pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse
Act, or to preliminary injunctions issued pursuant to an action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation.

5
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Utah Code§ 76-5-106.5

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" means:
(i) a verdict or conviction;
(ii) a plea of guilty or guilty and mentally ill;
(iii) a plea of no contest; or
(iv) the acceptance by the court of a plea in abeyance.
(b) "Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or toward a specific person, including:

,_J

(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or interferes with a person's property:
(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone else to engage in any of these acts:
(A) approaches or confronts a person;
(B) appears at the person's workplace or contacts the person's employer or coworkers;
(C) appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's
neighbors, or enters property owned, leased, or occupied by a person;

(D) sends material by any means to the person or for the
4827-6090-8585. VI

purpose of obtaining or disseminating information about or communicating with the person to a member of the person's family or household,
employer, coworker, friend, or associate of the person;
(E) places an object on or delivers an object to property
owned, leased, or occupied by a person, or to the person's place of employment with the intent that the object be delivered to the person; or
(F) uses a computer, the Internet, text messaging, or any
other electronic means to commit an act that is a part of the course of conduct.

(c) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any
other person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household within the prior six months.
(d) "Emotional distress" means significant mental or psychological suffering, whether or not medical or other professional treatment or counseling
is required.
(e) "Reasonable person" means a reasonable person in the victim's
circumstances.

(£) "Stalking" means an offense as described in Subsection (2) or (3).
(g) "Text messaging" means a communication in the form of electronic text or one or more electronic images sent by the actor from a telephone or computer to another person's telephone or computer by addressing the communication to the recipient's telephone number.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly engages
in a course of conduct directed at a specific person and knows or should
know that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person:

(a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person;
or
(b) to suffer other emotional distress.
7
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(3) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates:
(a) a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a,
Stalking Injunctions; or
(b) a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this
section.
(4) In any prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that the actor:
(a) was not given actual notice that the course of conduct was unwanted; or
(b) did not intend to cause the victim fear or other emotional distress.
(5) An offense of stalking may be prosecuted under this section in any jurisdiction where one or more of the acts that is part of the course of conduct
was initiated or caused an effect on the victim.
(6) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor:
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or
._J

(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to
Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions.

(7) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking;
(b) has been previously convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is substantially similar to the offense of stalking;
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of
any crime in another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a
felony, in which the victim of the stalking offense or a member of the victim's immediate family was also a victim of the previous felony offense;
8
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(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection (9); or
(e) has been or is at the time of the offense a cohabitant, as defined in
Section 78B-7-102, of the victim.
(8) Stalking is a second degree felony if the offender:
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the
commission of the crime of stalking;
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of
stalking; ·
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or
jurisdictions of offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of stalking;
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under Subsection (7)(a), (b), or (c);
·
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if
committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which the victim of the stalking
was also a victim of the previous felony offenses; or
(f) has been previously convicted of an offense under Subsection
(7)( d) or (e).
(9)(a) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in
abeyance for a period of time serves as an application for a permanent
criminal stalking injunction limiting the contact between the defendant and
the victim.
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the court at
the time of the conviction. The court shall give the defendant notice of the
right to request a hearing.
9
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(c) If the defendant requests a hearing under Subsection (9)(b), it
shall be held at the time of the conviction unless the victim requests otherwise, or for good cause.
(d) If the conviction was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of
the judgment and conviction or a certified copy of the court's order holding
the plea in abeyance shall be filed by the victim in the district court as an
application and request for a hearing for a permanent criminal stalking injunction.
(10) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the district court granting the following relief where appropriate:
(a) an order:
(i) restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or place of employment of the victim; and

(ii) requiring the defendant to stay away from .the victim, except as provided in Subsection (11), and to stay away from any specified
place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by the victi~;
(b) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with or
regarding the victim, including an order forbidding the defendant from
personally or through an agent initiating any communication, except as
provided in Subsection (11), likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim, including personal, written, or telephone contact with or regarding the
victim, with the victim's employers, employees, coworkers, friends, associates, or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim; and

(c) any other orders the court considers necessary to protect the victim and members of the victim's immediate family or household.
10
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(11) If the victim and defendant have minor children together, the court
may consider provisions regarding the defendant's exercise of custody and
parent-time rights while ensuring the safety of the victim and any minor
children. If the court issues a permanent criminal stalking injunction, but
declines to address custody and parent-time issues, a copy of the stalking
injunction shall be filed in any action in which custody and parent-time issues are being considered and that court may modify the injunction to balance the parties' custody and parent-time rights.
(12) Except as provided in Subsection (11 ), a permanent criminal stalking
injunction may be modified, dissolved, or dismissed only upon application
of the victim to the court which granted the injunction.
(13) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to
this section shall be sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or
similar system.
(14) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section has effect statewide.
(15)(a) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant tq this section constitutes
a third degree felony offense of stalking under Subsection (7).
(b) Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a criminal action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both.
(16) This section does not preclude the filing of a criminal information for
stalking based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the
stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions,
or
a
permanent
criminal
stalking
injunction.

11
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Utah Const. Art. 1, § 6

The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other
lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the
Legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.

4827-6090-8585. V l

Utah Code § 53-5a~102
§

53-5a-102. Uniform firearm laws

(1) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally protected right under Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform civil and criminal firearm laws
throughout the state.
(2) Except as specifically provided by state law, a local authority or state
entity may not:
(a) prohibit an individual from owning, possessing, purchasing, selling, transferring, transporting, or keeping a firearm at the individual's
place of residence, property, business, or in any vehicle lawfully in the individual's possession or lawfully under the individual's control; or
(b) require an individual to have a permit or license to purchase,
own, possess, transport, or keep a firearm.
(3) In conjunction with Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, this section is
uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its political subdivisions and municipalities.
(4) All authority to regulate firearms is reserved to the state except where
the Legislature specifkally delegates responsibility to local authorities or
state entities.
(5) Unless specifically authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local authority or state entity may not enact, establish, or enforce any ordinance,
regulation, rule, or policy pertaining to firearms that in any way inhibits or
restricts the possession or use of firearms on either public or private property.

(6) As used in this section:

4 82 7-6090-85 85. V I

(a) "firearm" has the same meaning as defined in Section 76-10-501;
and
(b) "local authority or state entity" includes public school districts,
public schools, and state institutions of higher education.
(7) Nothing in this section restricts or expands private property rights.

14
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Utah Code § 76-10-503

(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5;
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony;
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section
62A-7-101;
(iv) within the last 10 years has been adjudicated delinquent
for an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a violent
felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5;
(v) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United
States; or
..J

(vi) is on probation for a conviction of possessing:
(A) a substance classified in Section 58-37-4 as a Schedule I or II controlled substance;
(B) a controlled substance analog; or
(C) a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2.
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony;
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a
felony;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined
in Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly
4827-6090-8585.V I

..J

and intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense;
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a
felony offense;
·
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided
in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993),1 or has been committed to a mental institution;
(viii) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or
vJ

(ix) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen
of the United States.
(c) As used in this section, a conviction of a felony or adjudication
of delinquency for an offense which would be a felony if committed by an
adult does not include:
(i) a conviction or adjudication of delinquency for an offense
pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraint of trade,
or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices
not involving theft or fraud; or

(ii) a conviction or adjudication of delinquency which, according to the law of the jurisdiction in which it occurred, has been expunged, set aside, reduced to a misdemeanor by court order, pardoned or
regarding which the person's civil rights have been restored unless the
pardon, reduction, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly
provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
(d) It is the burden of the defendant in a criminal case to provide
evidence that a conviction or adjudication of delinquency is subject to an
exception provided in Subsection (l)(c), after which it is the burden of the
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conviction or adjudica16
4827-6090-8585.Vl

tion of delinquency is not subject to that exception.
.__)

J

(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees,
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have
under the person's custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly
purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or
control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(3) A Category II restricted person who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or
control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the
same time.
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in another section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under this custody or control any dangerous weapon, the penalties of that
section control.
(6) It is an affirmative defense to a charge based on the definition in Subsection (l)(b)(iv) that the person was:
(a) in possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner for use of a member of the person's household or for
administration to an animal owned by the person or a member of the person's household; or
(b) otherwise authorized by law to possess the substance.
17
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(7)(a) It is an affirmative defense to transferring a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a person restricted under Subsection (2) or (3) that the
firearm or dangerous weapon:
(i) was possessed by the person or was under the person's
custody or control before the person became a restricted person;

(ii) was not used in or possessed during the commission of a
crime or subject to disposition under Section 24-3-103;
(iii) is not being held as evidence by a court or law enforcement agency;
(iv) was transferred to a person not legally prohibited from
possessing the weapon; and
(v) unless a different time is ordered by the court, was transferred within 10 days of the person becoming a restricted person.
(b) Subsection (7)(a) is not a defense to the use, purchase, or possession on the person of a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a restricted
person.
(8)(a) A person may not sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any firearm
or dangerous weapon to any person, knowing that the recipient is a person described in Subsection (l)(a) or (b).
(b) A person who violates Subsection (8)(a) when the recipient is:
(i) a person described in Subsection (l)(a) and the transaction
involves a firearm, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a person described in Subsection (l)(a) and the transaction
involves any dangerous weapon other than a firearm, and the transferor
has knowledge that the recipient intends to use the weapon for any unlawful purpose, is guilty of a third degree felony;
(iii) a person described in Subsection (l)(b) and the transaction involves a firearm, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
18
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(iv) a person described in Subsection (l)(b) and the transaction involves any dangerous weapon other than a firearm, and the transferor has knowledge that the recipient intends to use the weapon for any
unlawful purpose, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(9)(a) A person may not knowingly solicit, persuade, encourage or entice
a dealer or other person to sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of a firearm
or dangerous weapon under circumstances which the person knows
would be a violation of the law.
(b) A person may not provide to a dealer or other person any information that the person knows to be materially false information with
intent to deceive the dealer or other person about the legality of a sale,
transfer or other disposition of a firearm or dangerous weapon.
11

(c) Materially false information" means information that portrays
an illegal transaction as legal or a legal transaction as illegal.
,

(d) A person who violates this Subsection (9) is guilty of:
(i) a third degree felony if the transaction involved a firearm;
or

(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the transaction involved a dangerous weapon other than a firearm.

19
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United States Const. Amend. II

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

@

@
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18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person-(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 1Q~__ of the Controlled Substances Act (21
u.s.c. 802));
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been
committed to a mental institution;
(5) who, being an alien-(A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or
(B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted
to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)));
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions;
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced
his citizenship;
(8) who is subject to a court order that-(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received
actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate
partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an
intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or
21
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v)

child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or

(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that
would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; or
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence,
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.

22
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - TG0'ELE
TOOELE COUNTY, S'F-1tTE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. TOM BARNES
CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-112 - RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT 3rd Degree Felony
(amended) to Class A Misdemeanor
Offense Date: October 27, 2014
Plea: December 23,

2014 Guilty

Disposition: June 19, 2015 Dismissed (w/o prej)
Charge 2 - 76-5-112 - RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT 3rd Degree Felony
(amended) to Class A Misdemeanor
Offense Date: October 27, 2014
Plea: December 23, 2014 Guilty
Disposition: June 19, 2015 Dismissed (w/o prej)
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
ROBERT ADKINS
PARTIES
Defendant - TOM BARNES
Represented by: GARY K SEARLE
Represented by: RICHARD TANNER
Plaintiff -

STATE OF UTAH

Represented by: GARY K SEARLE
Bondsman -

REBEL BAIL BOND INC

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: TOM BARNES
Offense tracking number: 46278495
Date of Birth: March 07, 1942
Law Enforcement Agency: TOOELE COUNTY SHERIF
LEA Case Number: 46278495
Prosecuting Agency: TOOELE COUNTY
Agency Case Number: 141408746
ACCOUNT SUMMARY

viJ

TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:

1,000.00

Amount Paid:

1,000.00
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CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony
Credit:

0.00

Balance:

0.00

PAPER BOND TOTALS

Posted:

8,055.00

Forfeited:

0.00

Exonerated:

8,055.00

Balance:

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COURT COSTS

i~

Amount Due:

1,000.00

Amount Paid:

1,000.00

Amount Credit:

0.00

Balance:
0.00
NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety
Posted By: REBEL BAIL BOND INC (#53780)
Posted:

8,055.00

Forfeited:

0.00

Exonerated:

8,055.00

Balance:

0.00

PROCEEDINGS
10-29-14 Filed: INFORMATION/INDICTMENT
10-29-14 Case filed
10-29-14 Filed: From an Information
10-29-14 Judge ROBERT ADKINS assigned.
10-29-14 Filed: TCSO PC Statement
10-29-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
10.-29-14 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on November 03, 2014 at 10:28 AM

in Room 221 with Judge ADKINS.
,.:i)

11-03-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for INITIAL APPEARANCE

Judge:

ROBERT ADKINS

PRESENT
Clerk:

nancyw

Prosecutor: SEARLE, GARY K
Defendant not present

Audio
Tape Count: 10:50
HEARING
Printed: 07/27/15 16:35:01
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CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony

Defendant failed to appear for hearing, he bonded out of the jail,
Mr. S~arle with verify with the jail the date he was given to
appear, and he will notifiy the court.
,41)

11-03-14 Note: ***The jail gave the defendant the date of 11-17-14 to
appear for court, per the county attorney***
11-03-14 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on November 17, 2014 at 10:28 AM
in Room 221 with Judge ADKINS.

~

11-11-14 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance
11-11-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
11-17-14 ROLL CALL scheduled on December 23, 2014 at 01:30 PM in Room
221 with Judge ADKINS.
11-17-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance
Judge:

ROBERT ADKINS

PRESENT
Clerk:

nancyw

Prosecutor: SEARLE, GARY K

Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): TANNER, RICHARD

Audio
Tape Count: 11:34
INITIAL APPEARANCE

A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
The Information is read.
Advised of charges and penalties.
The defendant is advised of right to counsel.
Defendant advised he is not to posses or carry a firearm while this
felony case is pending.

If he does, he could be charged with

another felony.
ROLL CALL is scheduled.
Date: 12/23/2014
Time : o1 : 3 o p . m .
Location: Room 221
TOOELE COURTS COMPLEX

74 SOUTH 100 EAST
TOOELE, UT 84074
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Page 3

Paqe 3 of s

CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony
Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS
11-17-14 Filed: notice of hearing
11-25-14 Filed: REBEL BAIL BOND INC
11-25-14 Bond Account created
11-25-14 Bond Posted

8055.00
Total Due:

Non-Monetary Bond:

8055.00
8,055.00

12-23-14 Filed: amended information
12-23-14 Filed: statement of defendant entering a guilty plea
12-23-14 Bond Exonerated
12-23-14 Charge 1

-8,055.00

Disposition is Plea in abeyanc

12-23-14 Charge 1 amended to Class A Misdemeanor
12-23-14 Charge 2 amended to Class A Misdemeanor
12-23-14 Charge 2

Disposition is Guilty

12-23-14 Charge 2

Disposition is Plea in abeyanc

12-23-14 Minute Entry - Plea in abeyance
Judge:

ROBERT ADKINS

PRESENT
Clerk:

nancyw
Prosecutor: SEARLE, GARY K

Defendant
Defendant's Attorney{s): TANNER, RICHARD
Audio
Tape Count: 2:03
Change of Plea Note
On states motion defendant pled guilty to amended counts 1 and 2 of
reckless endangerment, both MA to be held in abeyance rather than
agg assault both F3.
PLEA IN ABEYANCE

Defendant's plea is held in abeyance.
PLEA IN ABEYANCE ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS

Guilty plea held in abeyance for 6 months.

Conditons:

No further

violations, pay fees in full
Tracking review date for Plea in Abeyance: 06/23/2015

The defendant is ordered to pay the fee of 1000.00 for COURT COSTS.
Page 4

Printed: 07/27/15 16:35:01

Paqe 4 of 5

CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony
Pay fine to The Court.

This can be paid online at:

www.utcourts.gov/payments.
12-23-14 Fee Account created
Total Due:
12-23-14 COURT COSTS

Payment Received:

1000.00
1,000.00

01-02-15 Filed order: plea in abeyance, sentence, judgment, commitment
Judge ROBERT ADKINS
Signed January 02, 2015
06-19-15 Charge 1

Disposition is Dismissed (w/o

06-19-15 Charge 2 Dis~osition is Dismissed (w/o
06-19-15 Case Closed
Disposition Judge is ROBERT ADKINS
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